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This paper tests the hypothesis that the timing of welfare payments affects criminal activity.  Analysis
of daily reported incidents of major crimes in twelve U.S. cities reveals an increase in crime over the
course of monthly welfare payment cycles.  This increase reflects an increase in crimes that are likely
to have a direct financial motivation like burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and robbery,
as opposed to other kinds of crime like arson, assault, homicide, and rape.  Temporal patterns in crime
are observed in jurisdictions in which disbursements are focused at the beginning of monthly welfare








  Consider an individual who receives support from monthly welfare payments that 
are distributed at the beginning of the month.  These payments may be made directly to 
this individual or to someone who provides for the individual or transacts with the 
individual.  Welfare payments are disbursed on a monthly basis, and a series of studies 
indicate that the typical recipient of cash assistance increases consumption immediately 
following the receipt of payments and exhausts these payments quickly.  Poor individuals 
are also unlikely to have access to savings or credit that might help cover temporary cash 
shortfalls and often have weak earnings prospects in legitimate economic activity.  
Consequently, this hypothetical individual might deplete welfare related income quickly 
and turn to crime to supplement this income.  This paper tests the hypothesis that income 
generating criminal activity is increasing in the amount of time that has passed since 
welfare payments occurred.  
The analysis exploits plausibly exogenous variation in the timing of payments 
across cities and differences in the likely motivation of different kinds of crime.  The 
three welfare programs that provide the largest share of income maintenance benefits to 
the poor are considered; these are the Food Stamp program, the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) program, and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.  
The sample of reported incidents of crime covers 12 cities in which more than 10% of the 
population receives payments from the most inclusive welfare program, the Food Stamp 
program.  If patterns in crime are influenced by the timing of welfare payments, then 
increases in crime over the course of monthly payment cycles should be most pronounced 
in cities in which such payments are focused at the beginning of these cycles.  If criminal   2
income is used to supplement welfare income, then any increase in crime should be 
reflected in Type I Uniform Crime Report (UCR) or Group A National Incident Based 
Reporting System (NIBRS) crimes with a direct financial motivation (burglary, larceny-
theft, motor vehicle theft, and robbery) and not other Type I UCR or Group A NIBRS 
crimes (arson, assault offenses, forcible sex offenses, and homicide).   
Two approaches yield results indicating that crime rates do in fact increase in the 
amount of time that has passed since welfare payments occurred.  The first approach tests 
if levels of criminal activity are different in the first ten calendar days of the month; this 
timeframe corresponds to the period over which Food Stamp payments occur in cities 
where they are focused at the beginning of the month.  Rates of crime and counts of 
reported incidents are higher after the first ten days of the month in jurisdictions where 
welfare payments are focused at the beginning of the month but not in other jurisdictions.  
The second approach employs an index that reflects the number of days since welfare 
payments occurred in a city.  This index takes into account payments related to not only 
Food Stamps but also TANF and SSI.  Higher values of the index are associated with 
more crime.   
Both approaches also reveal that increases in crime over the course of monthly 
welfare payment cycles are only observed for crimes that are likely to have a financial 
motivation and not for other Type I UCR or Group A NIBRS crimes.  These findings are 
inconsistent with explanations for temporal patterns in crime that are unrelated to the 
timing of welfare payments, like explanations related to police officer deployment or 
incentives to report crimes as having occurred at certain times.    3
  The findings in this paper make a number of contributions.  First, they suggest a 
role for behavioral considerations in economic explanations for criminal activity. Becker 
(1968) provides a framework for analyzing criminal behavior in which criminals 
rationally weigh the costs and benefits of illegal activity and are more likely to turn to 
crime when they are likely to earn less from legitimate activities.  This framework has 
received ample empirical support.
1  Recent work that shows that cash assistance 
recipients typically spend their payments too quickly suggests one mechanism by which a 
particular behavioral bias, short-run impatience, could affect the decision to engage in 
criminal activity.  Shapiro (2005) documents that food stamp recipients experience a 
decline in caloric intake and an increase in the marginal utility of consumption in 
between food stamp payments.  Stephens (2003) finds that households that primarily 
depend on social security for income increase spending on goods that reflect 
instantaneous consumption in the first few days following the receipt of their check.  
Dobkin and Puller (2007) find that welfare recipients increase their consumption of 
illegal drugs when their checks arrive at the beginning of the month, spurring an increase 
in hospitalizations and deaths. These studies provide evidence of behavior that suggests 
short-run impatience and violations of the permanent income hypothesis.
2  My results 
suggest that this type of consumption behavior is associated with increased criminal 
                                                 
1 Numerous studies including Donohue and Levitt (2001), Raphael and Winter-Ember (2001), and earlier 
work summarized in Freeman (1995) have found a significant but small effect of unemployment on 
property crimes. Machin and Meghir (2004) and Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002) find that changes in 
earnings of low wage and unskilled workers in particular affect crime. 
2 Phelps and Pollak (1968) develop a simple framework of short-run impatience, and this framework is 
employed by Laibson (1997), O’Donohue and Rabin (1999), O’Donohue and Rabin (2001), and Angeletos 
et al. (2001) to consider a variety of economic applications.  A number of papers provide evidence on the 
validity of the permanent income hypothesis by studying the immediate consumption response to changes 
in income.  Recent work includes Shapiro and Slemrod (2003), Hsieh (2003), and Johnson, Parker, and 
Souleles (2006).  Lee and McCrary (2005) present evidence that criminals typically have low discount rates 
or hyperbolic time preferences.     4
activity later in monthly welfare payment cycles.  These types of behavioral effects call 
for distinctive public policy responses, as noted by Jolls (2007) and Bertrand, 
Mullainathan, and Shafir (2004). 
Second, the paper illustrates an effect of the design of welfare programs on crime.  
A large literature, parts of which are reviewed in Moffitt (1992) and Blank (2002), 
considers the effects of welfare programs on employment, poverty, family structure, and 
other factors.  Some studies analyze the effects of welfare payments on criminal activity 
using cross sectional data.  DeFranzo (1996, 1997) and Hannon and DeFranzo (1998a, 
1998b) present evidence that welfare payments reduce major crimes.  However, Burek 
(2005) finds that welfare payments are associated with higher levels of less severe 
crimes.  These studies typically face challenges controlling for all the characteristics of 
jurisdictions that are likely to affect both the use of welfare programs and criminal 
activity.  The findings in my paper point out that the timing and frequency of welfare 
payments have effects that carry policy implications.  Staggered, frequent payments 
would smooth levels of crime.  Police forces might therefore have an easier time fighting 
crime because they would be less likely to be overwhelmed during particular periods.  If 
welfare beneficiaries do exhibit short run impatience when making consumption 
decisions, as indicated in the literature, frequent payments would smooth their 
consumption and reduce the extent to which they face dire circumstances because they 
consumed welfare related income too quickly.  Levels of crime would be lower as a 
consequence. 
  This paper also adds to the burgeoning literature on household finance.  Campbell 
(2006) explores this field.  Only a small part of the work in this field specifically   5
considers the personal finances of low-income individuals.  Duflo, Gale, Liebman, 
Orszag, and Saez (2006) and Beverly, Shneider, and Tufano (2006) argue that low-
income individuals in particular do not save enough.  Low savings levels can have 
detrimental consequences for the poor, who face severe credit constraints as documented 
in Adams, Einav, and Levin (forthcoming), Barr (2004) and elsewhere.  My analysis does 
not study the income, savings, and consumption behaviors of poor individuals directly, 
but it does suggest that individuals who exhaust their legitimate income rapidly and do 
not have access to savings or credit attempt to increase their income through criminal 
activity.
3 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section explains the 
hypotheses in more detail, and Section 3 describes the data and the main tests.  Section 4 
presents the results, and the last section concludes. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
Welfare payments are distributed on a monthly basis according to payment 
schedules that vary across programs and states.  In many jurisdictions, payments from all 
the major programs to all recipients occur during a short period within each month, 
typically the beginning of the month.  Payment schedules are set at the state and federal 
level, not the city level, and they have not changed substantially over the last decade.  
Conversations with state policy makers suggest that the distribution schedule for 
payments was set on the basis of administrative considerations rather than considerations 
related to patterns in consumption or criminal activity.   
                                                 
3 Garmaise and Moskowitz (2006) show that weak credit conditions increase crime more generally.   6
Studies of the consumption of cash assistance recipients, including Shapiro 
(2005), and Stephens (2003), reveal that recipients do not smooth their consumption but 
instead exhibit short run impatience.  They appear to spend their monthly payments too 
quickly and to experience increasing marginal utility of consumption over monthly 
payment cycles.  This increase in the marginal utility of consumption in part reflects that 
the poor do not have access to savings or credit, as documented in Adamds, Einav, and 
Levin (forthcoming), Duflo, Gale, Liebman, Orszag, and Saez (2006), Beverly, Shneider, 
and Tufano (2006), and Barr (2004).  
As a consequence, in jurisdictions where all welfare payments occur at the 
beginning of the month, individuals who are welfare recipients or who transact with or 
receive support from a recipient might not have the resources to satisfy their needs later 
in the monthly payment cycle.  Such individuals may turn to crime to augment their 
welfare related income later in payment cycles.  Frameworks that account for short-run 
impatience, like the one developed in O’Dononhue and Rabin (1999), suggest that such 
individuals will delay criminal activity even if they anticipate a cash shortfall at the time 
of the payment and plan to make up this shortfall with criminal income.  This is because 
criminal activity has immediate costs; it requires effort and potentially results in 
punishment. 
Even an individual who receives support from welfare payments and does not 
exhibit short-run impatience may be more likely to engage in criminal activity later 
during monthly welfare payment cycles.  He may have very low income, a high marginal 
utility of consumption, no savings or access to credit, and face uncertainty about the 
extent to which he will face a cash shortfall.  He may, for example, face unexpected   7
shocks to the prices of the goods he consumes.  Given this uncertainty, he would be likely 
to delay criminal activity until it is necessary. 
These considerations imply predictions for temporal patterns in crime in different 
kinds of cities.  In cities where payments from welfare programs are focused at the 
beginning of the month, criminal activity should increase as the time since payments 
occurred increases.  Increased criminal activity should reflect increases in types of crime 
that have a financial motivation, not other kinds of crime.  In cities where welfare 
programs make payments to different recipients on different days over longer time 
periods or where payments to individuals occur more frequently than once a month, there 
should not be any significant monthly temporal pattern in crime.   
This discussion has stressed the effect of the timing of welfare payments on the 
demand for criminal income.  It is worth considering briefly the potential effects of the 
timing of payments on the supply of victims.  These potential effects tend to work against 
the predictions described above.  If all welfare payments occurred at a particular point in 
time during the month, this might increase the pool of potential victims and the 
attractiveness and ease of stealing property.  Crime rates could then be higher 
immediately following payments.  However, most welfare payments are distributed onto 
electronic benefit transfer cards, and the funds on these cards are difficult to steal because 
recipients must present a valid identification card to use them.  Alternatively, potential 
victims of crime might respond to changes in the demand for criminal income by taking 
additional avoidance measures.  For example, potential victims of burglary or robbery 
could remain ensconced in their locked homes during periods when such crimes are 
expected to be more common.  However, most avoidance activities are costly.  Therefore,   8
the timing of disbursement is unlikely to have a large effect on the supply of potential 
victims. 
 
3. Data and Tests 
  The basic empirical approach is to study differences in criminal activity over the 
course of monthly welfare payment cycles in cities across which there is variation in the 
timing of payments.  This analysis requires information on the distribution of welfare 
payments by jurisdiction and detailed crime data. 
 
3.1 Data on Welfare Programs 
The three primary welfare programs that provide income maintenance benefits are 
the Food Stamps program, the TANF program, and the SSI program.  Each of these 
programs provides assistance to poor households that meet income and resource 
requirements.  The Food Stamp program provides funds that can be used at most grocery 
stores, and the TANF program provides income maintenance payments to needy families.  
In most states, both of these programs distribute payments electronically through 
electronic benefit transfer debit cards, and payments that are not spent in a particular 
month are carried forward to the next month.  SSI pays benefits to disabled adults and 
children who have limited means.  SSI payments are distributed by check, which is 
mailed to recipients once a month.  The Food Stamp program has the broadest coverage 
in the sense that TANF and SSI recipients typically meet the eligibility requirements to 
receive food stamps.  Because of its extensive coverage, I selected a sample of cities on 
the basis of participation in the food stamp program.   9
Quantifiable effects of the timing of welfare payments on crime are more likely to 
be observed in jurisdictions where a substantial share of the population received such 
payments.  Fellowes and Berube (2005) compute food stamp program participation rates 
in major metropolitan areas and counties.  On the basis of their study, I select those 
jurisdictions in which at least 10% of the population participates in the Food Stamp 
program.  This screen yields a sample of 15 cities including Baltimore, MD; Detroit, MI; 
El Paso, TX; Fresno, CA; McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX; Memphis, TN; Miami, FL; 
Milwaukee, WI; New Orleans, LA; New York, NY; Newark, NJ; Philadelphia, PA; 
Providence, RI; St. Louis, MO; and Washington, DC.  As explained below, data on 
reported incidents of crime are not available for Memphis, New York, and McAllen-
Edinburg-Mission, so the final sample includes 12 cities. 
Panels A and B of Table 1 provide information on the use of the three main 
welfare programs in each city in the sample.  For comparability with the data on the Food 
Stamp program which are drawn from Fellowes and Berube (2005), the data on TANF 
and SSI programs cover the year 1999.
4  On average across cities, the Food Stamp 
program serves about twice as many people as TANF programs and more than three 
times as many people as SSI.  The value of TANF program payments and SSI program 
payments often exceed the value of food stamp payments, implying higher payments per 
recipient.  However, relative to TANF and SSI, Food Stamps have become a more 
significant source of income over the 1999-2005 period.  Appendix Table 1 provides 
information on the value of all three programs from 1999 through 2005.  Averaged across 
                                                 
4 Data on the value of family assistance and SSI program payments are taken from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis Local Area Personal Income Database.  Numbers of family assistance recipients are obtained from 
the offices of state TANF directors.  Data on the number of SSI recipients for counties are from SSI 
Recipients by State and County, and for MSAs they are drawn from the State and Metropolitan Area 
Databook 1997-1998.    10
cities, the compound annual growth rate in the value of food stamps over this period is 
8.2% while the rates for TANF and SSI are -0.7% and 2.3%, respectively. 
Panel C of Table 1 provides information about the timing of payments for each 
program in each city.  In most jurisdictions, each of the three programs makes payments 
to recipients once a month.
5  In some jurisdictions, Food Stamp and TANF payments 
occur during time periods.  For example, in Fresno, Food Stamps are paid over the first 
ten days of the month, with the date of distribution depending on the last digit of the 
recipient’s case number.  TANF payments occur twice per month in three of the cities in 
the sample.       
 
3.2 Data on Criminal Activity 
Conducting tests on the effects of the timing of welfare payments on crime across 
jurisdictions also requires detailed data on reported incidents of crime.  Unfortunately, 
comprehensive incident data for the cities in which welfare is widely used are not 
available in NIBRS; NIBRS only covers jurisdictions that have agreed to provide data, 
and very few large cities have done so.  Therefore, obtaining these data required directly 
contacting police departments.  In order to ensure the comparability of data across 
jurisdictions, I attempted to obtain data covering the 2004-2006 period on each incident 
that is classified as a Part I UCR offense or a Group A NIBRS offense.  These categories 
of crime include arson, assault offenses, burglary, forcible sex offenses, homicide, 
larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and robbery.  For each incident, I requested 
information about the type, the date and time, and the location of the incident.   
                                                 
5 Cole and Lee (2005) identify the dates on which Food Stamp disbursements occur.  I confirmed these 
dates and obtained data on the timing of TANF payments from the divisions of state and local governments 
that oversee this program.   11
12 of the 15 jurisdictions identified above provided useable data.
6  Table 2 
provides a description of the crime data obtained from each of the cities included in the 
sample.  All of the cities except Detroit used the UCR reporting system.  Although I 
attempted to obtain complete data covering the 2004-2006 period from each jurisdiction, 
detailed data from some cities are only available for portions of this time frame, as 
indicated in the last column of Table 2.
7   
 
3.3 The Tests 
  The empirical tests consider two measures of crime—crime rates and counts of 
reported incidents of crime.  Crime rates are computed by taking the number of reported 
incidents of crime on a particular day in a particular city and dividing that number by the 
sample period average number of daily reported incidents in the city.  OLS specifications 
are used to analyze crime rates and negative binomial specifications are used to analyze 
counts of reported incidents.   
Variation in the timing of payments allows me to conduct two kinds of tests.  The 
first is transparent but somewhat crude.  It distinguishes between cities in which Food 
Stamp payments are distributed in the first 10 days of the month and those in which 
payments are more staggered.  Food Stamp payments occur early in the month in Detroit, 
Fresno, Newark, Philadelphia, Providence, and Washington, and I refer to this sample as 
the Early Payment Sample.  Food Stamp payments are more staggered in the month in 
                                                 
6 The three cities that did not provide data are Memphis, New York, and the McAllen-Edinburg-Mission 
MSA.  Police officers in Memphis and New York denied my requests for data and rejected my appeals of 
their denials.  McAllen-Edinburg-Mission is not a single city but is a collection of three cities so I excluded 
it. 
7 In several jurisdictions, changes to computer systems prevented departments from providing me with data 
for the full sample period.  Certain kinds of crime are not included in the data for some cities.  For example, 
arson is not covered in the sample for six cities.  In some jurisdictions, this type of crime is collected and 
aggregated by the fire department and not the police department.     12
Baltimore, El Paso, Miami, Milwaukee, New Orleans, and St. Louis, and I refer to this 
sample as the Staggered Payment Sample.  Tests explaining levels of crime include a 
dummy that is equal to one in the first 10 days of the month and otherwise equal to zero 
as well as an interaction between this dummy and a dummy that is equal to one for the 
Staggered Payment Sample and zero for the Early Payment Sample. The coefficient on 
the time specific dummy reveals if criminal activity is lower in the early part of the 
month in cities where welfare payments are focused at the start of the month, and the 
coefficient on this variable interacted with the Staggered Payment Dummy reveals if 
temporal patterns in crime are any different in cities where payments are more staggered. 
  Information on the magnitude and timing of TANF payments and SSI payments 
raises a concern about distinguishing among cities on the basis of the timing of Food 
Stamp payments alone.  As indicated in Panel C of Table 1, SSI payments are received on 
the 1
st of the month in all jurisdictions.  TANF programs make payments twice a month 
in Detroit, Philadelphia, and Providence, which are all in the Early Payment Sample and 
these payments are made on the 1
st of the month in Milwaukee, which is classified as part 
of the staggered payment sample.  In robustness checks, I remove observations from 
Detroit, Philadelphia, Providence, and Milwaukee, from the data, leaving a set of cities 
for which the classification based on the timing of Food Stamp payments is less subject 
to this concern.   
  The second type of test employs an index that reflects the number of days that 
have passed since recipients received their last welfare payment in a particular city.  It is 
computed using the information on the number of welfare recipients and the dates of 
payments.  All three of the major welfare programs are taken into account.  For programs   13
that make payments over a period of days within a month, I assume that an equal number 
of recipients receive payments on each of the days within the period.  For each program 
on each calendar day, I compute the average number of days that have passed since 
recipients received their last payment.  For example, if Food Stamp payments occur on 
the first and second day of the month, on the fourth day of the month this average will be 
two and a half days.  I then take a weighted average of these program-specific measures 
where weights are set equal to the number of total recipients in each program.
8  The 
weighted average is divided by 30 to create an index that takes on values between zero 
and one.  If all welfare recipients received a payment from each program on the 1
st of the 
month, the index would be zero on that day, and if no additional payments occurred over 
the course of the month, the index would be equal to one on the last day of months with 
31 days. 
  To provide further intuition for this index, Figure 1 displays values of the index 
by the day of the month for Providence and St. Louis.  In Providence, Food Stamps and 
SSI payments occur only once a month on the 1
st of the month, and TANF payments 
occur twice a month on the first and 16
th.  Therefore, the index for Providence is zero on 
the 1
st of the month.  It increases over the course of the month and drops down on the 16
th 
to reflect the fact that TANF recipients receive a payment at that time.  In St. Louis, SSI 
payments occur on the 1
st of the month, but Food Stamp and TANF payments are 
distributed over the first 22 days of the month with different recipients receiving payment 
on different days.  As a consequence, there is less variation in the index for St. Louis than 
there is for Providence, and it declines over the first 22 days of the month before 
increasing.  One benefit of using this index in specifications that identify patterns in 
                                                 
8 Similar indices and results are obtained if the values of program payments are used as weights.   14
criminal activity is that it allows for the use of fixed effects for each calendar day of the 
month.   
  By identifying effects of the timing of welfare program payments off of 
differences in payment schedules across cities, the tests rule out explanations for 
temporal patterns in crime that are unrelated to welfare payments but that are related to 
factors that are likely to be operative in all the cities in the sample.  For example, rents 
are typically due at the start of the month, and these payments could induce criminal 
activity at the end of the month.  Paychecks from legitimate employment are also often 
issued once or twice a month.  Differences in temporal patterns of crime across cities 
where the timing of welfare payments differs are not consistent with alternative 
explanations for an increase in crime throughout the month based on these kinds of 
considerations. 
The tests are performed for different types of crime.  The main hypothesis makes 
predictions about the timing of crimes in which perpetrators are likely to have a direct 
financial motivation.  I refer to burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and robbery 
as financially motivated crimes.  I refer to Other Type I or Group A crimes as non-
financially motivated or other crimes, and they include arson, assault offenses, forcible 
sex offenses, and homicide.
9   
Some factors would give rise to the same temporal patterns for both types of 
crime.  Police officers may have an incentive to document incidents as occurring at a 
                                                 
9 This distinction is not perfect.  For some incidents, a criminal commits more than one offense, and these 
incidents are typically classified according to the most serious offense in the data according to a hierarchy 
established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  For example, if a criminal robs and then kills his 
victim, this incident is typically classified as a homicide.  Therefore, some incidents that are classified as 
non-financially motivated crimes may have financial motivations.  It is noteworthy that the crime data do 
not cover the possession and sale of illegal drugs.  Evidence presented in Dobkin and Puller (2007) 
suggests that this kind of activity occurs most frequently soon after the distribution of government transfer 
payments, when drug users have the resources to increase their consumption.   15
particular time, perhaps the beginning or end of the month.  If the deployment of law 
enforcement resources varies through the month, criminals of all types might time their 
activity so as to minimize the chances of arrest.  Criminals might also benefit from 
conspiring to commit more of all types of crimes at a particular point in time because 
limited enforcement resources could be more easily evaded.  Under each of these 
scenarios, financially motivated crimes and other types of crime would exhibit similar 
temporal patterns.  However, if patterns in crime reflect the timing of welfare payments, 
then only financially motivated crimes should become more prevalent over the course of 
the welfare payment cycles in jurisdictions where payments are focused at the beginning 
of these cycles. 
  In keeping with the analysis of patterns in crime presented in papers like Jacob, 
Lefgren, and Morretti (2007) and Jacob and Lefgren (2003), the analysis below controls 
for the effects of weather and holidays on crime.  Daily data on the average temperature 
in degrees Fahrenheit, inches of precipitation, and inches of snowfall are obtained from 
the National Climatic Data Center.
10  Days that are U.S. federal holiday are identified as 
holidays.  Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.  
 
4. Results 
  Figure 2 presents crime rates, averaged over three day intervals for the Early 
Payment Sample and the Staggered Payment Sample.  Daily crime rates are computed for 
each city and type of crime by dividing the count of reported incidents by the sample 
                                                 
10 For each city, weather measurements are taken from the airport station nearest to the city and missing 
data are augmented with data from other nearby stations.     16
period average number of reported incidents in the city.
11  Panel A displays rates for all 
crimes.  The solid line with diamond markers indicates how rates change over the course 
of the month in cities in the Early Payment Sample.  In the cities in this sample, the 
overall crime rate is above average in the middle of the month, and it falls at the 
beginning of the month.  It reaches its lowest point, 0.97, at the start of the month and 
then increases to about 1.01 over the next two weeks, implying an increase of about 4%.  
Panel B and C respectively show crime rates for financially motivated crimes and non-
financially motivated crimes.  In cities in the Early Payment Sample, there are 
pronounced monthly cycles in the rate of financially motivated crimes but no discernable 
trend in other crimes.  Financially motivated crime rates increase from around 0.96 at the 
beginning of the month to more than 1.02, indicating an increase of about 6%.   
  The dotted lines with square markers indicate how crime rates change over the 
course of the month for cities in the Staggered Payment Sample.  In this sample, there is 
no apparent trend in overall crime, financially motivated crime, or other crime over the 
course of the month.  These patterns in Figure 1 are consistent with the theory that 
welfare beneficiaries exhaust their welfare related income soon after receiving it and then 
attempt to augment their income with income from criminal activity later in the month.  
Patterns in crime observed in the Early Payment Sample do not appear to be a 
consequence of factors that are also operative in the Staggered Payment Sample. 
  Table 4 presents the results of specifications that analyze patterns in total reported 
incidents of Type I or Group A crimes.  The dependent variable studied in the OLS 
specifications in columns 1-4 is the crime rate, which is defined as the number of 
reported incidents in a city on a particular date divided by average daily reported 
                                                 
11 Jacob, Lefgren, and Morretti (2007) use a similar approach to measure weekly crime rates.   17
incidents in the city.  Each specification in Table 4 includes two kinds of fixed effects.
12  
City*Month*Year fixed effects control for differences across cities even if these vary 
month to month.  For example, these fixed effects control for local election cycles that 
have been shown by Levitt (1997) to affect the size of police forces.  City*Day of Week 
fixed effects control for differences in criminal activity across days of the week in 
individual cities.  Standard errors that allow for clustering within each city/month pair 
appear in parentheses.
13 
The coefficients on Dummy for 1
st-10
th are negative and significant in columns 1 
and 2.  The -0.0318 coefficient in column 2 implies that the crime rate is 3.2% below 
average during the first ten days of the month in cities where welfare payments are 
focused in the beginning of the month.  The coefficients on the Staggered Payment 
Dummy interacted with the Dummy for 1
st-10
th are positive and significant and of 
slightly smaller magnitude than the coefficients on the Dummy for 1
st-10
th.  An F-test 
reveals that the sum of the coefficients on Dummy for 1
st-10
th and on the interaction 
terms for each specification is not statistically distinguishable from zero.  These results 
indicate that there are no discernable increases in reported incidents of crime in cities in 
the Staggered Payment sample.  Factors that are operative in both the Early Payment 
sample and the Staggered Payment sample do not explain increases in crime in the Early 
Payment sample.   
                                                 
12 The results in Table 4 and the remainder of the analysis do not appear to depend on the inclusion of these 
fixed effects.  Using only city fixed effects to control for constant city characteristics yields estimates of the 
effects of the timing of welfare payments on crime that are similar.  
13 In order to consider the possible effect of serial correlation on the magnitude of the standard errors, I 
have also computed these for the OLS specifications using a block bootstrap technique.  This approach 
yields very similar estimates that do not materially change the significance of the results.   18
  The specifications in column 2 include controls for weather and a dummy that is 
equal to one on holidays and zero otherwise.  Consistent with previous work, crime 
appears to increase as temperatures rise and decrease with precipitation and snowfall.  
Crime rates are also lower on holidays. 
  The specifications presented in columns 3 and 4 are similar to those in columns 1 
and 2, but they use the Time Since Payment Index to identify the effects of the timing of 
welfare payments, and they also include a fixed effect for each calendar day of the 
month.  These specifications identify the effect of the timing of payments off of 
differences in how the index changes over the course of the month across cities.  The 
results indicate that crime rates increase with the amount of time that has passed since 
welfare payments occurred. The 0.1079 coefficient on the Time Since Payment Index in 
column 4 implies that, if all welfare payments occurred on the 1
st of the month, crime 
rates would be 10.8% higher on the 31
st of the month relative to the 1
st of the month. 
  Columns 5-8 of Table 4 contain results of negative binomial specifications that 
analyze counts of reported incidents as opposed to crime rates.  The results in the 
specifications are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to those in columns 1-4.  
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that criminal income supplements 
welfare income at the end of monthly welfare payment cycles.   
  The timing of welfare payments is hypothesized to affect crimes in which 
perpetrators have a direct financial motivation and not necessarily other kinds of crime.  
The specifications in Table 5 analyze crimes that are likely to have financial motives.  
The specifications in this table are the same as those presented in Table 4 except the 
dependent variables analyzed are the rate of financially motivated crime in columns 1-4   19
and the count of reported incidents of financially motivated crime in columns 5-8.  As in 
Table 4, the coefficients on the Dummy for 1
st-10
th are negative and significant, and the 
coefficients on this dummy interacted with the Staggered Payment Dummy are positive 
and significant.  These results indicate that there are increases in financially motivated 
crimes in cities where welfare payments are focused at the beginning of the month.  In 
cities where welfare payments are more staggered, increases are less pronounced and do 
not differ statistically from the null of there being no temporal trend.  The coefficients on 
the Time Since Payment Index are also positive and significant.   
  The effects of the timing of welfare payments on financially motivated crimes 
appear to be more pronounced than its effects on total crime analyzed in Table 4.  The -
0.0378 coefficient on the Dummy for 1
st-10
th in column 2 implies that, in the Early 
Payment Sample, the financially motivated crime rate is 3.8% (as opposed to 3.2% for all 
crimes) below average in the first 10 days of the month than it is over the rest of the 
month.  The 0.1254 coefficient on Day of the Month in column 4 indicates that if all 
welfare payments occurred on the 1
st of the month, the financially motivated crime rate 
would be 12.5% (as opposed to 10.8% for all crimes) higher on the 31
st of the month 
relative to the 1
st. 
  If patterns in crime were attributable to reporting biases or effects of police 
deployment that are similar across different types of crime, then the data would indicate 
an increase in non-financially motivated crimes over the course of welfare payment 
cycles as well.  The hypothesis that patterns in crime reflect income needs that arise 
during welfare payment cycles does not make this prediction.  Table 6 presents results of 
specifications that test for temporal trends in non-financially motivated crimes.  These   20
specifications are the same as those presented in Tables 4 and 5, but the dependent 
variables considered are the non-financially motivated crime rate in columns 1-4 and the 
count of reported incidents of non-financially motivated crime in columns 5-8.  The 
results do not indicate any statistically significant relations between the timing of welfare 
payments and non-financially motivated crimes.  The coefficients on the Dummy for 1
st-
10
th are positive, but they are insignificant and of much smaller magnitude than the 
coefficients on this variable in the specifications that explain financially motivated crimes 
presented in Table 5.  The coefficients on the Time Since Payment Index are also 
insignificant, and they are very small in magnitude in columns 7 and 8.  These results 
suggest that explanations for patterns in crime over monthly welfare payment cycles that 
do not differentiate between financially motivated and other crimes are incomplete.   
  Table 7 displays analysis of financially motivated crimes by type of crime.  The 
specifications are the same as those presented in columns 7 and 8 of Table 5, but the 
dependent variable is the count of reported burglaries in columns 1 and 2, larcenies in 
columns 3 and 4, motor vehicle thefts in columns 5 and 6, and robberies in columns 7 and 
8.  The Time Since Payment Index attracts a positive coefficient in each specification, 
and these coefficients are significant for all types of crime except burglary.  The 
insignificant coefficient on burglary could reflect the fact that burglars often study 
potential targets before deciding to enter them and typically attempt to commit their 
crimes when properties are unoccupied.
14  Therefore, this type of crime may be less 
motivated by short run liquidity needs than other kinds of financially motivated crimes.  
The implied effect of the timing of welfare payments is particularly pronounced for 
robbery.  The 0.2224 coefficient on the Time Since Payment Index in column 8 implies 
                                                 
14 Weisel (2002) and Clarke (2002) provide descriptive information about burglary.   21
that robbery rates are 22% higher on the 31
st of the month relative to the 1
st of the month 
in a jurisdiction where all welfare payments occur on the 1
st of the month.  This result 
might reflect the fact that individuals who have exhausted their welfare related income 
need liquid assets, and robbery is more likely to yield cash than other financially 
motivated crimes. 
The results indicate effects of the timing of welfare payments on measures of 
crime at the city level.  If increases in criminal activity were focused among welfare 
beneficiaries and these beneficiaries committed only a fraction of crimes, then increases 
in crime among this population would be larger than the aggregate results indicate.  
Exploring this possibility would require detailed information on the sources of income of 
the perpetrators of crimes.  However, such data are not available.  According to national 
data, only approximately 15% of Part I UCR crimes result in an arrest and detailed 
income data are not even collected for arrested individuals.
15   
Even though detailed income data for perpetrators are not available, it is possible 
to compare the demographics of arrested individuals with those who receive support from 
welfare payments to determine if it seems plausible that they are behind any temporal 
patterns in financially motivated crime.  Harlow (1998 and 2000) presents the results of 
surveys of jail inmates and finds that individuals who are in jail for committing 
financially motivated crimes report very low pre-arrest levels of monthly income and that 
more than 75% of them qualify for and receive public counsel.  Therefore, the income 
profile of criminals is similar to the income profile of welfare recipients.
16 
                                                 
15 See Crime in the United States, published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
16 There are some indications of gender differences between welfare recipients and criminals.  During the 
sample period, 59% of Food Stamp recipients, 57% of SSI recipients, and 60% of TANF recipients were 
female, but only 30% of individuals arrested for financially motivated crimes were female.  Furthermore, a   22
As mentioned in Section II, the distinction between the Early Payment Sample 
and the Staggered Payment Sample used in the tests that include the dummy that is equal 
to one for the first ten days of the month is subject to some concerns.  This distinction is 
based on the timing of Food Stamp payments.  Although this form of welfare is the 
largest in terms of the number of recipients, TANF programs are larger in value terms in 
many jurisdictions, and the timing of TANF payments differs from the timing of Food 
Stamp payments.  In order to confirm that results are robust to using a more strictly 
defined sample, I drop Detroit, Philadelphia, Providence, and Milwaukee, from the 
sample.  These are cities in which either Food Stamp payments are focused at the 
beginning of the month but TANF payments are more staggered or Food Stamp payments 
are staggered but TANF payments are focused at the beginning of the month.
17   
The results of some of the specifications presented in Tables 5 and 6, run using 
the reduced sample, appear in Appendix Table 2.  The results indicate that using the more 
strictly defined sample yields estimates suggesting larger effects of the timing of welfare 
payments on financially motivated crimes in the Early Payment Sample.  Using the more 
refined sample, there are, as before, no significant temporal patterns in non-financially 
motivated crimes in either the strictly defined Early Payment Sample or Staggered 
Payment Sample.   
Appendix Table 3 presents results of two other robustness checks.  First, 
measurement error or reporting biases could give rise to an excessive number of reported 
                                                                                                                                                 
large fraction of the males who received TANF benefits were young children.  These patterns suggest that 
individuals committing crimes are not solely the direct recipients of payments and include indirect 
beneficiaries as well. 
17 In this robustness check, I do not drop New Orleans.  Food Stamp payments occur during the 5
th-14
th 
period and TANF payments occur from the 1
st-5
th.  This payment schedule is consistent with including this 
city in the Staggered Payment Sample.  Removing it does not qualitatively or quantitatively change the 
results in a significant way.   23
incidents on the first or last day of the month.  For example, if there is a delay between 
when a crime occurs and when it is discovered or reported, there may be an incentive to 
report the crime on the first or last day of the month so it is included in crime statistics for 
that month.  The results are little changed by dropping observations from the first and last 
day of each month from the sample.  As a second additional robustness check, New 
Orleans is dropped from the sample.  The New Orleans data only cover 2006 and 
conflating factors related to the aftermath of hurricane Katrina could affect patterns of 
crime in the city.  The results indicate that removing New Orleans from the sample does 
not substantively change the results. 
 
5. Conclusion 
  Analysis of patterns in crime in 12 large U.S. cities where more than 10% of the 
population receive Food Stamps indicates that the timing of welfare payments affects 
criminal activity.  More crime takes place when more time has passed since welfare 
payments occurred.  The increase reflects an increase in crimes in which the perpetrator 
is likely to have a financial motivation and not other types of Part I UCR or Group A 
NIBRS offenses.  Temporal patterns in crime are not observed in jurisdictions where 
welfare payments are relatively more staggered.  These findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis that individuals who receive support from welfare payments consume welfare 
related income quickly and then attempt to supplement it with income from criminal 
activity. 
  The results suggest a role for behavioral considerations in economic explanations 
of crime.  Existing research indicates that welfare recipients exhibit short-run impatience   24
and do not smooth their consumption of welfare income.  My results suggest this type of 
consumption behavior is associated with increased criminal activity later in monthly 
welfare payment cycles. 
  The results also carry implications for the design of welfare programs.  Increasing 
the frequency of welfare payments would smooth patterns in crime.  Smooth levels of 
criminal activity might make crime easier to combat because police departments would 
be unlikely to be overwhelmed.  If welfare beneficiaries do exhibit short-run impatience, 
frequent payments would smooth their consumption and reduce the extent to which they 
face dire circumstances because they consumed welfare related income too quickly.  As a 
result, more frequent payments would also lower crime rates.  Nearly all jurisdictions 
now distribute Food Stamp and TANF payments on electronic benefit transfer cards, so 
the costs of more frequent payments would be likely to be low.  Shaprio (2005), Wilde 
and Ranney (2000), and Ohls, Fraker, Martini, and Ponza (1992) also present arguments 
in favor of more frequent payments.   
  Finally, the findings have implications for the deployment of police officers and 
the labor laws applicable to law enforcement.  In jurisdictions where welfare payments 
are focused at the beginning of the month, increased levels of criminal activity at the end 
of the month call for increased police protection during this time.  However, 1986 
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act require that law enforcement officers be 
compensated with overtime pay for working more than 40 hours a week.  As a 
consequence, it might be costly for departments to shift resources to times when they are 
particularly needed.  More flexible labor laws could help police departments alter 
deployment schedules to prevent and combat crime.   25
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 Figure 1: This figure displays the values of the Time Since Payment Index for Providence and St. Louis for each day of 
the month.  The Time Since Payment Index is an index between zero and one that reflects the average number of days 
that have passed since welfare recipients received their last payment.  It accounts for payments related to Food Stamps, 
TANF, and SSI.  If a program makes payments over a range of dates, it is assumed that an equal number of recipients 
receives payment on each day in the range. The total number of recipients in each program is used to weight the 
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Providence St. LouisPanel A: Crime Rate--All Crimes
Panel B: Crime Rate--Financially Motivated Crimes
Figure 2. This figure displays crime rates over the course of the month.  Panel A displays rates for all crimes that are classified as Type I crimes 
in the UCR reporting system and Group A crimes in the NIBRS reporting system.  Panel B display rates for crimes in which the perpetrator is 
likely to have a direct financial motivation, specifically burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and robbery. Panel C displays rates for other 
crimes, specifically arson, assault offenses, forcible sex offenses, and homicide.  The data points displayed are calculated by taking average crime 
rates across three day periods for cities in which Food Stamp payments are focused at the beginning of the month and cities in which these 
payments are more staggered.  Crime rates for each city on each day are computed by taking incident counts and dividing by the sample period 



































































Early Payment Sample Staggered Payment SamplePanel A: Population and Share of Population Receiving Welfare Payments
City Population Food Stamps TANF SSI
Early Payment Sample
Detroit, MI 2,061,162 12.2% 6.3% 3.7%
Fresno, CA 799,407 10.2% 7.3% 4.5%
Newark, NJ 793,633 11.5% 5.1% 3.2%
Philadelphia, PA 1,517,550 17.9% 9.3% 5.4%
Providence, RI 621,602 10.0% 6.6% 3.4%
Washington, DC 572,059 14.3% 8.5% 3.5%
Staggered Payment Sample
Baltimore, MD 651,154 15.3% 7.5% 5.1%
El Paso, TX 679,622 16.7% 2.6% 3.1%
Miami, FL 2,253,362 11.3% 2.7% 4.8%
Milwaukee, WI 940,164 10.6% 3.2% 3.4%
New Orleans, LA 1,381,652 12.0% 1.7% 2.0%
St. Louis, MO 348,189 22.4% 5.6% 5.3%
Panel B: Value of Welfare Payments
City Food Stamps TANF SSI
Early Payment Sample
Detroit, MI 214,368 407,981 394,728
Fresno, CA 81,530 183,609 206,600
Newark, NJ 92,768 94,436 124,160
Philadelphia, PA 264,965 288,589 436,889
Providence, RI 43,410 108,703 99,618
Washington, DC 81,061 100,401 91,231
Staggered Payment Sample
Baltimore, MD 103,252 139,554 162,470
El Paso, TX 100,659 30,488 75,551
Miami, FL 208,965 143,462 502,810
Milwaukee, WI 71,092 165,946 204,177
New Orleans, LA 161,504 27,150 89,401
St. Louis, MO 70,183 67,542 89,401
Table 1
Welfare Program Details by City
This table provides details about welfare programs in the twelve cities in the sample.  Panel A lists city populations and the percent of the 
population receiving Food Stamps, TANF payments, and Supplemental Security Income.  Panel B provides data on the value of payments (in 
thousands of dollars) for each of these programs and Panel C lists the dates in the month on which these payments are distributed.  Population data 
and data on the number of recipients and the value of payments are all for the year 1999, except the number of SSI recipients in Miami, FL and El 
Paso, TX are for the year 1995.  Data from Detroit, MI cover Wayne County, Fresno, CA Fresno County, Newark, NJ Essex County, Philadelphia, 
PA Philadelphia County, Providence, RI Providence County, Washington, DC District of Columbia County, Baltimore, MD Baltimore City, El 
Paso, TX El Paso MSA, Miami, FL Miami MSA, Milwaukee, WI Milwaukee County, New Orleans, LA Orleans Parish, St. Louis, MO St. Louis 
County.Panel C: Delivery Dates of Welfare Payments
City Food Stamps TANF SSI
Early Payment Sample
Detroit, MI 1st - 9th
Twice a month, 
staggered 1st
Fresno, CA 1st - 10th 1st 1st
Newark, NJ 1st - 5th 1st 1st
Philadelphia, PA 1st-10th
Twice a month, 
staggered 1st
Providence, RI 1st 1st and 16th 1st
Washington, DC 1st - 10th 1st 1st
Staggered Payment Sample
Baltimore, MD 6th-15th 1st-15th 1st
El Paso, TX 1st-15th 1st-15th 1st
Miami, FL 1st - 15th 1st - 15th 1st
Milwaukee, WI 2nd-15th 1st 1st
New Orleans, LA 5th - 14th 1st-5th 1st
St. Louis, MO 1st - 22nd 1st - 22nd 1stCity Type of Crimes Covered Sample Period
Detroit, MI All Group A NIBRS Crimes 2005-2006
Fresno, CA All Part I UCR Crimes 2004-2006
Newark, NJ All Part I UCR Crimes except Rape and Arson 2005-2006
Philadelphia, PA All Part I UCR Crimes except Arson 2004-2006
Providence, RI All Part I UCR Crimes except Arson 2004-2006
Washington, DC All Part I UCR Crimes 08/01/2004-09/30/2005, 2006
Baltimore, MD All Part I UCR Crimes except Arson and Homicide 2006
Milwaukee, WI All Part I UCR Crimes 2005-2006
St. Louis, MO All Part I UCR Crimes 2004-2006
Miami, FL All Part I UCR Crimes 2004, 08/01/2005-12/31/2006
New Orleans, LA All Part I UCR Crimes except Arson, Homicide, and Rape 2006
El Paso, TX Robbery, Burglary, Theft, Motor Vehicle Theft 07/01/05-12/31/06
Table 2
Crime Data Coverage
This table displays information about the crime data obtained from each city in the sample.  Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation
Crime Rate--All Crimes 1.000 0.999 0.181
Count of Reported Incidents--All Crimes 107.747 96.000 65.975
Crime Rate--Financially Motivated Crimes 1.000 0.996 0.215
Count of Reported Incidents--Financially Motivated Crimes 91.633 75.000 60.017
Crime Rate--Other Crimes 1.000 0.947 0.539
Count of Reported Incidents--Other Crimes 15.673 12.000 12.118
Count of Reported Incidents--Burglary 16.904 13.000 14.679
Count of Reported Incidents--Larceny 45.478 42.000 29.708
Count of Reported Incidents--Motor Vehicle Theft 20.001 16.000 14.657
Count of Reported Incidents--Robbery 9.251 6.000 9.503
Dummy for 1st-10th 0.329 0.000 0.470
Time Since Payment Index 0.470 0.455 0.178
Average Temperature 59.802 62.000 17.930
0.108 0.000 0.342
Snowfall 0.051 0.000 0.504




The crime data include reported incidents of all crimes that are classified as Type I crimes in the UCR reporting system and Group 
A crimes in the NIBRS reporting system.   Financially motivated crimes include reported incidents of crimes in which the 
perpetrator is likely to have a direct financial motivation, specifically burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and robbery.  
Other crimes include arson, assault offenses, forcible sex offenses, and homicide.  Crime rates for each city on each day are 
computed by taking incident counts and dividing by the sample period average number of daily reported incidents in the city.  
Dummy for 1st-10th is a dummy that is equal to one in the first ten days of the month and zero otherwise.  Time Since Payment 
Index is an index between zero and one that reflects the average number of days that have passed since welfare recipients received 
their last payment.  Average temperature is the average temperature in degrees Fahrenheit. Precipitation and snowfall are measured 
in inches.  The Holiday Dummy is equal to one on U.S. federal holidays and zero otherwise.Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.9921 0.8744 0.9231 0.7699 3.3180 4.5112 3.6260 4.4797
(0.0038) (0.0185) (0.0253) (0.0314) (0.0265) (0.0145) (0.0353) (0.0311)
Dummy for 1st-10th -0.0292 -0.0318 -0.0234 -0.0256
(0.0063) (0.0061) (0.0053) (0.0051)
0.0255 0.0266 0.0170 0.0176
(0.0092) (0.0089) (0.0083) (0.0079)
Time Since Payment Index 0.1044 0.1079 0.0802 0.0819
(0.0266) (0.0262) (0.0247) (0.0240)
Average Temperature 0.0026 0.0026 0.0028 0.0027
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
-0.0175 -0.0169 -0.0182 -0.0175
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0042)
Snowfall -0.0303 -0.0310 -0.0368 -0.0375
(0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0042) (0.0042)
Holiday Dummy -0.0977 -0.1014 -0.1074 -0.1111
(0.0112) (0.0110) (0.0107) (0.0102)
City * Month * Year Fixed Effects? YYYYYYY Y
City * Day of the Week Fixed Effects? YYYYYYY Y
Day of Month Fixed Effects? NNYYNNY Y
No. of Obs. 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496
R-Squared 0.3853 0.4111 0.3962 0.4221
Log Likelihood -37,061 -36,767 -36,975 -36,677
Crime Rate Count of Reported Incidents




The Effects of the Timing of Welfare Payments on Crime
The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is the crime rate, and for columns 5-8 it is a count of the total reported incidents of crime.  The crime data include reported incidents of all crimes that are 
classified as Type I crimes in the UCR reporting system and Group A crimes in the NIBRS reporting system.  Crime rates for each city on each day are computed by taking incident counts and 
dividing by the sample period average number of daily reported incidents in the city.  The specifications presented in columns 1-4 are OLS specifications, and those in columns 5-8 are negative 
binomial specifications.  Each specification includes fixed effects for each city/month/year combination and each city/day of the week pair, and the specifications in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 also 
include fixed effects for each day of the month.  Dummy for 1st-10th is a dummy that is equal to one in the first ten days of the month and zero otherwise.  Staggered Payment Dummy is equal to 
one for cities where Food Stamp payments are not exclusively made during the first ten days of the month.  Time Since Payment Index is an index between zero and one that reflects the average
number of days since welfare recipients received their last payment.  Average temperature is measured in degrees Fahrenheit. Precipitation and snowfall are measured in inches.  The Holiday 
Dummy is equal to one on U.S. federal holidays and zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors that allow for clustering within each city-month appear in parentheses.Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 1.0022 0.9425 0.9062 0.8202 3.2596 4.4191 3.5594 4.3752
(0.0043) (0.0208) (0.0269) (0.0347) (0.0286) (0.0146) (0.0377) (0.0324)
Dummy for 1st-10th -0.0353 -0.0378 -0.0300 -0.0322
(0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0054) (0.0051)
0.0313 0.0325 0.0239 0.0248
(0.0098) (0.0095) (0.0088) (0.0083)
Time Since Payment 0.1226 0.1254 0.0984 0.0998
(0.0285) (0.0281) (0.0259) (0.0253)
Average Temperature 0.0019 0.0019 0.0021 0.0020
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
-0.0082 -0.0075 -0.0098 -0.0091
(0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0046) (0.0047)
Snowfall -0.0321 -0.0329 -0.0393 -0.0400
(0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0044) (0.0044)
Holiday Dummy -0.1374 -0.1411 -0.1459 -0.1496
(0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0119) (0.0115)
City * Month * Year Fixed Effects? YYYYYYYY
City * Day of the Week Fixed Effects? YYYYYYYY
Day of Month Fixed Effects? NNYYNNYY
No. of Obs. 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496
R-Squared 0.4715 0.4925 0.4799 0.5010
Log Likelihood -36,191 -35,916 -36,115 -35,836
Precipitation
Count of Reported Incidents
Staggered Payment Dummy *     Dummy 
for 1st-10th
Table 5
The Effects of the Timing of Welfare Payments on Crime--Financially Motivated Crimes
The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is the crime rate, and for columns 5-8 it is a count of the total reported incidents of crime.  The crime data include reported incidents of crimes in which 
the perpetrator is likely to have a direct financial motivation, specifically burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and robbery.  Crime rates for each city on each day are computed by taking 
incident counts and dividing by the sample period average number of daily reported incidents in the city.  The specifications presented in columns 1-4 are OLS specifications, and those in 
columns 5-8 are negative binomial specifications.  Each specification includes fixed effects for each city/month/year combination and each city/day of the week pair, and the specifications in 
columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 also include fixed effects for each day of the month.  Dummy for 1st-10th is a dummy that is equal to one in the first ten days of the month and zero otherwise.  
Staggered Payment Dummy is equal to one for cities where Food Stamp payments are not exclusively made during the first ten days of the month.  Time Since Payment Index is an index 
between zero and one that reflects the average number of days since welfare recipients received their last payment.  Average temperature is the average temperature in degrees Fahrenheit. 
Crime Rate
Precipitation and snowfall are measured in inches.  The Holiday Dummy is equal to one on U.S. federal holidays and zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors that allow for 
clustering within each city-month appear in parentheses.Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.9199 0.4595 0.8867 0.4062 2.5700 0.5670 0.5531 0.6120
(0.0112) (0.0459) (0.0616) (0.0764) (0.0460) (0.1054) (0.1067) (0.1131)
Dummy for 1st-10th 0.0065 0.0027 0.0135 0.0111
(0.0199) (0.0200) (0.0145) (0.0141)
0.0030 0.0047 -0.0142 -0.0138
(0.0258) (0.0253) (0.0197) (0.0192)
Time Since Payment Index 0.0763 0.0872 0.0155 0.0236
(0.0662) (0.0645) (0.0453) (0.0432)
Average Temperature 0.0080 0.0079 0.0074 0.0072
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0005)
-0.0833 -0.0824 -0.0770 -0.0763
(0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0124) (0.0125)
Snowfall -0.0199 -0.0200 -0.0228 -0.0234
(0.0094) (0.0096) (0.0066) (0.0067)
Holiday Dummy 0.1575 0.1494 0.1306 0.1234
(0.0282) (0.0277) (0.0208) (0.0210)
City * Month * Year Fixed Effects? YYYYYYYY
City * Day of the Week Fixed Effects? YYYYYYYY
Day of Month Fixed Effects? NNYYNNYY
No. of Obs. 8,947 8,947 8,947 8,947 8,947 8,947 8,947 8,947
R-Squared 0.4194 0.4351 0.4224 0.4371
Log Likelihood -24,312 -24,119 -24,280 -24,100
Table 6
The Effects of the Timing of Welfare Payments on Crime--Other Crimes
The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is the crime rate, and for columns 5-8 it is a count of the total reported incidents of crime.  The crime data include reported incidents of arson, assault 
offenses, forcible sex offenses, and homicide.  Crime rates for each city on each day are computed by taking incident counts and dividing by the sample period average number of daily 
reported incidents in the city.  The specifications presented in columns 1-4 are OLS specifications, and those in columns 5-8 are negative binomial specifications.  Each specification includes 
fixed effects for each city/month/year combination and each city/day of the week pair, and the specifications in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 also include fixed effects for each day of the month.  
Dummy for 1st-10th is a dummy that is equal to one in the first ten days of the month and zero otherwise.  Staggered Payment Dummy is equal to one for cities where Food Stamp payments 
are not exclusively made during the first ten days of the month.  Time Since Payment Index is an index between zero and one that reflects the average number of days that have passed since 
welfare recipients received their last payment.  Average temperature is the average temperature in degrees Fahrenheit. Precipitation and snowfall are measured in inches.  The Holiday Dummy 
is equal to one on U.S. federal holidays and zero otherwise.  Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors that allow for clustering within each city-month appear in parentheses.
Precipitation
Crime Rate Count of Reported Incidents
Staggered Payment Dummy *      
Dummy for 1st-10thDependent Variable:
Type of Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 2.4598 2.9474 2.7416 3.6639 1.8927 2.6681 0.4264 1.9019
(0.0584) (0.0538) (0.0523) (0.0413) (0.0938) (0.0518) (0.0906) (0.0691)
Time Since Payment Index 0.0655 0.0708 0.0795 0.0806 0.1126 0.1132 0.2222 0.2251
(0.0477) (0.0468) (0.0322) (0.0316) (0.0469) (0.0468) (0.0622) (0.0625)
Average Temperature 0.0032 0.0022 0.0004 0.0028
Table 7
The Effects of the Timing of Welfare Payments by Type of Financially Motivated Crime
The dependent variable is the country of reported incidents of burglary in columns 1 and 2, larceny in columns 3 and 4, motor vehicle theft in columns 5 and 6, and robbery in columns 7 and 8.  
The specifications are negative binomial specifications, and each specification includes fixed effects for each city/month/year combination, each city/day of the week pair, and each day of the 
month.  Time Since Payment Index is an index between zero and one that reflects the average number of days since welfare recipients received their last payment.  Average temperature is the 
average temperature in degrees Fahrenheit. Precipitation and snowfall are measured in inches.  The Holiday Dummy is equal to one on U.S. federal holidays and zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors that allow for clustering within each city-month appear in parentheses.
Count of Reported Indcidents
Robbery Motor Vehichle Theft Larceny Burglary
Average Temperature 0.0032 0.0022 0.0004 0.0028
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007)
0.0197 -0.0281 0.0105 -0.0141
(0.0098) (0.0065) (0.0090) (0.0111)
Snowfall -0.0435 -0.0478 -0.0247 -0.0378
(0.0083) (0.0061) (0.0055) (0.0081)
Holiday Dummy -0.1357 -0.2013 -0.0623 -0.1267
(0.0211) (0.0146) (0.0212) (0.0250)
City * Month * Year Fixed Effects? YYYYYYY Y
City * Day of the Week Fixed Effects? YYYYYYY Y
Day of Month Fixed Effects? YYYYYYY Y
No. of Obs. 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496
Log Likelihood -26,183 -26,100 -32,078 -31,831 -27,813 -27,796 -22,007 -21,967
PrecipitationCity 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Early Payment Sample
Detroit, MI 214,368 184,614 198,103 228,424 278,983 313,485 373,735
Fresno, CA 81,530 77,333 77,210 84,075 91,431 107,505 130,202
Newark, NJ 92,768 81,240 75,459 73,506 77,060 85,071 95,870
Philadelphia, PA 264,965 242,318 236,811 244,870 405,520 303,778 337,227
Providence, RI 43,410 44,259 45,302 48,556 53,067 56,693 59,613
Washington, DC 81,061 74,875 70,862 77,074 95,185 96,825 103,176
Staggered Payment Sample
Baltimore, MD 103,252 94,394 94,263 97,190 108,055 119,352 131,438
El Paso, TX 100,659 95,164 99,027 111,226 140,900 170,434 198,981
Miami, FL 208,965 229,338 230,999 246,204 270,005 371,997 424,516
Milwaukee, WI 71,092 74,277 86,645 102,435 117,257 136,054 157,348
New Orleans, LA 101,959 95,955 104,774 119,186 121,294 133,431 235,945
St. Louis, MO 70,183 71,939 78,095 85,815 96,768 110,754 118,428
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Early Payment Sample
Detroit, MI 407,981 413,728 353,028 365,952 349,953 340,491 332,969
Fresno, CA 183,609 202,885 195,583 181,232 194,390 203,000 196,871
Newark, NJ 94,436 84,603 105,935 106,050 114,466 109,579 97,639
Philadelphia, PA 288,589 403,194 237,214 247,132 245,940 273,650 283,211
Providence, RI 108,703 110,766 106,010 108,097 101,959 101,527 109,847
Washington, DC 100,401 110,064 118,644 129,304 119,402 118,165 115,150
Staggered Payment Sample
Baltimore, MD 139,554 149,623 140,844 126,662 105,860 134,910 146,929
El Paso, TX 30,488 32,188 31,760 30,065 34,753 28,565 29,784
Miami, FL 143,462 157,218 163,535 150,467 130,201 125,873 110,398
Milwaukee, WI 165,946 219,813 271,941 280,726 293,403 307,476 287,444
New Orleans, LA 27,150 26,746 30,240 33,358 27,437 23,912 20,869
St. Louis, MO 67,542 70,109 70,747 63,650 37,134 37,839 34,890




This table displays the value of welfare program payments (in thousands of dollars) over the 1999-2005 period.  Data from Detroit, 
MI cover Wayne County, Fresno, CA Fresno County, Newark, NJ Essex County, Philadelphia, PA, Philadelphia County, 
Providence, RI Providence County, Washington, DC District of Columbia County, Baltimore, MD, Baltimore City, El Paso, TX, El 
Paso MSA, Miami, FL, Miami MSA, Milwaukee, WI, Milwaukee County, New Orleans, LA, Orleans Parish, St. Louis, MO, St. 
Louis County.1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Early Payment Sample
Detroit, MI 394,728 422,247 421,461 414,186 431,247 443,634 453,732
Fresno, CA 206,600 210,216 218,411 239,892 251,222 260,226 270,260
Newark, NJ 124,160 123,622 127,823 130,081 130,226 135,573 138,055
Philadelphia, PA 436,889 444,756 475,148 504,865 518,179 539,593 559,848
Providence, RI 99,618 105,204 114,169 118,562 121,949 127,133 132,877
Washington, DC 91,231 92,761 97,623 102,153 104,791 109,558 111,897
Staggered Payment Sample
Baltimore, MD 162,470 162,494 166,061 163,943 161,479 158,818 151,696
El Paso, TX 75,551 78,536 84,434 90,222 92,043 95,113 99,558
Miami, FL 502,810 518,923 540,317 554,838 588,162 602,794 611,416
Milwaukee, WI 204,177 197,271 200,476 207,026 212,753 219,155 220,835
New Orleans, LA 130,870 128,394 131,192 132,440 132,242 136,489 113,814
St. Louis, MO 89,401 89,318 91,174 92,594 92,458 93,109 93,527
SSIDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.9959 0.9213 4.7406 3.5178 0.9294 0.3487 2.6190 2.1234
(0.0051) (0.0286) (0.0162) (0.0449) (0.0149) (0.0749) (0.0332) (0.0432)
Dummy for 1st-10th -0.0466 -0.0483 -0.0426 -0.0441 -0.0155 -0.0174 0.0012 0.0012
(0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0285) (0.0289) (0.0135) (0.0139)
0.0486 0.0488 0.0432 0.0433 0.0338 0.0332 0.0092 0.0072
(0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0348) (0.0343) (0.0221) (0.0216)
Average Temperature 0.0015 0.0017 0.0092 0.0084
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0007)
-0.0160 -0.0157 -0.0851 -0.0859
(0.0069) (0.0061) (0.0180) (0.0145)
Snowfall -0.0336 -0.0510 -0.0210 -0.0643
(0.0036) (0.0122) (0.0215) (0.0213)
Holiday Dummy -0.1414 -0.1492 0.1710 0.1271
(0.0169) (0.0167) (0.0409) (0.0269)
City * Month * Year Fixed Effects? YYYYYYYY
City * Day of the Week Fixed Effects? YYYYYYYY
No. of Obs. 5,844 5,844 5,844 5,844 5,295 5,295 5,295 5,295
R-Squared 0.5058 0.5224 0.1535 0.1744
Log Likelihood -21,775 -21,652 -13,526 -13,406
Appendix Table 2
The Effects of the Timing of Welfare Payments on Crime: Alternative Sample
The dependent variable in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 is the crime rate and the specifications in these columns are OLS specifications.  The dependent variable in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 is a count of the 
total reported incidents of crime, and the specifications in these columns are negative binomial specifications.  Columns 1-4 consider crimes in which the perpetrator is likely to have a financial 
motivation, and columns 5-8 consider other crimes.  Crime rates for each city on each day are computed by taking incident counts and dividing by the sample period average number of daily 
reported incidents in the city.  Each specification includes fixed effects for each city/day of the week pair and each city/month/year combination.  Dummy for 1st-10th is a dummy that is equal to one 
in the first ten days of the month and zero otherwise.  Staggered Payment Dummy is equal to one for cities where Food Stamp payments are not exclusively made during the first ten days of the 
month.  Average temperature is the average temperature in degrees Fahrenheit. Precipitation and snowfall are measured in inches.  The Holiday Dummy is equal to one on U.S. federal holidays and 
zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors that allow for clustering within each city-month appear in parentheses.
Staggered Payment Dummy *      
Dummy for 1st-10th
Precipitation
Financially Motivated Crimes Other Crimes
Crime Rate
Count of Reported 
Incidents
Crime Rate
Count of Reported 
IncidentsType of Crime:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 4.3832 3.0718 0.0354 2.1020 4.4921 4.4140 2.3371 2.1787
(0.0191) (0.0377) (0.1059) (0.0611) (0.0171) (0.0295) (0.0531) (0.0440)
Dummy for 1st-10th -0.0245 0.0133 -0.0428 -0.0136
(0.0113) (0.0281) (0.0113) (0.0250)
0.0168 -0.0091 0.0227 -0.0155
(0.0084) (0.0194) (0.0083) (0.0193)
Time Since Payment Index 0.0913 0.0220 0.0967 0.0189
(0.0251) (0.0484) (0.0257) (0.0437)
Average Temperature 0.0021 0.0022 0.0068 0.0068 0.0020 0.0021 0.0072 0.0072
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005)
-0.0085 -0.0087 -0.0786 -0.0786 -0.0076 -0.0078 -0.0764 -0.0764
(0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0126) (0.0126)
Snowfall -0.0401 -0.0399 -0.0214 -0.0214 -0.0403 -0.0401 -0.0233 -0.0234
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0067) (0.0067)
Holiday Dummy -0.1523 -0.1524 0.0902 0.0901 -0.1464 -0.1465 0.1205 0.1205
(0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0210) (0.0211)
City * Month * Year Fixed Effects? YYYYYYYY
City * Day of the Week Fixed Effects? YYYYYYYY
Day of Month Fixed Effects? NYNYNYNY
No. of Obs. 8,873 8,873 8,360 8,360 9,132 9,132 8,583 8,583
Log Likelihood -33,334 -33,324 -22,444 -22,444 -34,627 -34,618 -23,450 -23,451
Appendix Table 3
The Effects of the Timing of Welfare Payments on Crime: Additional Robustness Checks
The dependent variable in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 is the incident count for crimes in which the perpetrator is likely to have a financial motivation.  For columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 it is the count for other 
crimes.  The specifications are negative binomial specifications.  The first four specifications remove the first and last day of each month from the sample, and the last four specifications remove 
New Orleans observations.  Each specification includes fixed effects for each city/month/year combination and each city/day of the week pair, and the specifications in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 also 
include fixed effects for each day of the month.  Dummy for 1st-10th is equal to one in the first ten days of the month and zero otherwise.  Staggered Payment Dummy is equal to one for cities 
where Food Stamp payments are not exclusively made during the first ten days of the month.  Time Since Payment Index is an index between zero and one that reflects the average number of days 
that have passed since welfare recipients received their last payment.  Average temperature is the average temperature in degrees Fahrenheit. Precipitation and snowfall are measured in inches.  The 
Holiday dummy is equal to one on U.S. federal holidays and zero otherwise.  Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors that allow for clustering within each city-month appear in parentheses.
Staggered Payment Dummy * Dummy 
for 1st-10th
Precipitation
Drop First and Last Day of Month Drop New Orleans
Financially Motivated Other Financially Motivated   Other